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Abstract 
Does corporate governance play a role in determining the capital structure of the firms? this study has been  
examined the relationship between corporate governance and the use of debt financing. The study shown that 
funds and institutional holdings has a negative and significant impact on leverage, suggesting that financial 
leverage degree decreased with the increased monitoring power of funds and institutional stockholdings. On the 
other hand, the holdings of large owners have a positive and significant relationship with leverage. In this study 
we present a number of explanations by viewing that entrenched managers may obtain a better access to debt 
market and then they can finance with extra debt this possibly is consider as an outcome of conservative 
investments policy they used. Our findings could be a helpful and practical for not only investors and financial 
managers, it could be useful also for financial consultants. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance one of the main issues have been raised recently in the corporate world. The corporate 
governance is a structure which monitors and controls the behavior of corporate executives in different areas 
such as financial one which can be applied by the board of directors (large owners), and institutional investors. 
Corporate governance Issue can have an effect on the various aspects of firm's management including the 
performance management, earnings management and capital structure. The management of capital structure, 
which reflects the financial leverage of companies and the way by which the capital of company is applied by the 
managers, is one of the important issues,   since the inclusion of debt in the capital structure may affect the 
performance and the market value of the firm.  
Optimal capital structure and sound corporate governance and an optimal are very important for each firm to 
improve the firm's market value. In literature, corporate governance is defined as the system by which businesses 
firms are directed and controlled, Kajola (2008). While Gill, Biger and Mathur, (2011), defined that the optimal 
capital structure includes debt, but the firm not financed 100% of debt. The ideal debt to equity ratio for the firm 
is when its minimize the costs of financing and reduce the likelihood of insolvency. Berle & Means (1932) were 
considered the first researchers that have discussed the theory of corporate governance.  Modiglani and Miller 
(1958) also pioneered the theory capital structure. It was alleged that the obtained understandings in the 
valuation of firms depending on the technique of funding depending on the accepting the structure of capital and 
the firm's assets. 
Since that, many researchers had tried to pursue their paths to build up innovative theories. For example, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) defined agency relationships (i.e., a contract between agent and principal to perform 
services on behalf of the principal). Studies have defined the financial leverage as the amount of debt which is 
obtained for needed financing in order to acquire the necessary property (Hampton, p. 2001). According to the 
mentioned definition, the companies can be defined based on the financing as companies with high and low 
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degree of financial leverage. In general, the leverage ratios indicate the amount of debts in the capital structure of 
company funding.  
According to the information asymmetry theory, the managers have more information than the investors about 
the prospect of company and this fact is called asymmetric information. For that reason, because the managers 
have more information about the future of company, they do not engage others in the future profit of company; 
hence, they offer the financial needs of company throughout using debt; but if they do not, they will meet the 
financial needs of company through the share distribution. 
Another key point,  that self-governing mangers and institutional shareholders generally encouraged directors to 
enlarge shareholder's yields throughout larger risk-taking. Shareholders may find it may most favorable to boost 
risks as they do not internalize the social cost of failures. In addition, since of the firms-specific human capital 
and private benefit of control, directors tend to seek out a lesser level of risks than shareholders (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009).  
This paper examines the effects of variables in the corporate governance on leverage level for a sample of 
Jordanian companies, proxy variables were selected from earlier observed works. The variables include:  the 
ownership of insiders, financial institutions (funds), corporate stockholders and foreign stockholders. The study 
may provide policy makers in Jordan with more insight to the style of governance which may ensures an optimal 
capital structure; therefore investors and shareholders will make a further consideration about the capital market 
and investment decisions.  
The rest of this study is structured as follows: section 2:  present literature reviews. Section 3: the hypotheses and 
its discussion. Section 4: The methodology and data and section 5 present the results and findings. And finally 
concludes. 
2. Literature Reviews 
A study by abdoli, Lashkary and dehghani(2012) examined the effect of corporate governance on financial 
leverage by using a sample of 77 Iranian companies. They concluded that the board independence and the 
presence of internal auditor have a significant relationship with the ratio of debt (financial leverage). 
Sabour, Al-Farouq and Karim (2009) evaluated the effect and relationship between the structure of ownership 
and board structure, and financial performance of companies in Botswana Stock Exchange. They found that 
there was a difference between the corporate governance systems among the companies due to the difference in 
the measured performance. Diversification in capital market with different combinations is one of the reasons 
which they cited in their paper. 
Gruszczynski, Marek (2006) examined the relationship between levels of corporate governance and the financial 
performance for companies listed in Poland. The results have shown that the level of corporate governance in 
firms of Poland are  related to their capability to duplicate through financial closure based on what is illustrated 
by its liquidities'  degree and its profitability in addition to the financial leverage variables. 
Cuong and Canh (2012), in their study had used a set of data for companies listed on  Vietnam stock exchange 
markets. They found that the optimal debt ratio, of less than 59.27% raise the value of the firms. 
 Ron Jana (2010) evaluated the relationship between some of the boards characteristics, and the structure of 
corporate capital in Nepal. The results shown that: the corporate governance leads to lower financial leverage 
and disputes in the agencies. Experimental results of relationship are only significant statistically about the 
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combination of board and conservative tenure, but it is not significant about the size and skill of board. On the 
other hand, the results show a positive correlation between the number of executive leaders in the board and the 
level of debt. Finally, the findings show that the management of building companies uses the higher debt level as 
a mean of expropriation for a few shareholders, not as a punitive and disciplinary mean. 
Cheng and Tzeng (2011) in there paper of 645 firms had listed in the Taiwan Securities Exchange (TSE) (2000-
2009),  they found a significant and positive relationship between the value of the firm and its leverage. 
Adeyemii &  Oboh (2011) used a data of 90 companies from Nigeria and found that the firm's market value  is 
influenced positively  by its alternatives of capital structure which means the level of leverage. In summary, all 
studies had shown that both financial leverage and corporate governance are correlated and as a result affecting 
the firms values. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Research Hypotheses: 
Ho:  There is no significant relationship between corporate governance and the degree of leverage 
4. Methodology 
4.1. The data 
We used a sample of annual observations for  publicly owned companies that have selected from pool of firms 
listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), that fulfilled each of the following criterias: First: Financial sector 
companies have expelled from our sample due to the high  leverage degree, also its performance measurements 
cannot be significantly compared to other  companies  in the other industries.  Second: the firms' common stocks 
must list with no disruption on the ASE between 2005 and 2011.  Finally, almost most data and ownerships 
associated to financial information are completely obtainable. In this paper we used data and financial 
information were collected from firms are listed in, in addition Institutional ownerships information are gathered 
from the Jordanian security Depository Center. 
4.2. Variables and Model 
4.2.1 Variables 
This paper has examined the components of corporate governance and analyzed the relationships between this 
attribute and the financial leverage degree. 
Dependent Variable: The degree of financial leverage (LEVi,t): which is measured as  the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets for company (i) at year (t).  
• Independent Variables: Corporate Governance. 
To examine the governance we used the following factors; the ownership of insiders, financial institution (funds), 
corporate stockholders and foreign stockholders. The Insiders ownership (INS) component has calculated by the 
ratio of insider's stockholding (insiders whom hold 5% or above of total outstanding common stocks. The 
financial institutions ownerships (FIS) have been measured by the ratio of financial institutions (Fund) 
stockholding. In the same way the ownerships of corporate were considered by the ratio of corporate 
stockholdings (CS), and foreign ownerships (FORS) is calculated by foreign stockholding's ratio. 
• The control variables 
We control for the following firm characteristics: 
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• SIZE: firm's size which is used as a proxy for the capacity to entrée the capital market, 
 SIZE i,t = The Natural logarithm firm's i total assets. 
• Dividends payments (DIVY
 i,t)  the dividend yields of firm i in time t , which is equal  payments paid 
divided by the value of the stock.  
• Growth (Investment) opportunities Tobin’s Q
 i,t , measured as market value of asset-to-book value of asset 
ratio for firm i in time t, and equals  (Book value of debt + Market value of equity) / Book value of assets. 
• CASH i,t , Corporate Cash Holding for company i in time t, and it is cash equivalents divided by net Assets.  
Where: Net Assets= Total Assets – cash and cash equivalent (Opler et al. 1999). 
• Return on Equity (ROE I,t) the measure of firm's performances and calculates as ROE = Net Profit after Tax 
/ Total Common Equity. 
 
4.2.2 The Model 
  
In this paper we examined the financial leverage degree of firms that influenced by the factors of corporate 
governance, and we consider some firm's characteristics. On the other hand, it is not easy to interpret the results 
since there a problem of endogeneity has appeared. Financial leverage degree may reduce the agency costs result 
from the shareholder-manager conflict by imposing more monitoring on managers decision concerning 
borrowing but corporate governance authority may also support firm borrowing and increase the degree of 
financial leverage. First to report for endogeneity between corporate governance and financial leverage we 
regress the contemporary corporate governance measurements on the values of financial leverage degree one 
period lag degree, and additional explanatory variables. The lags allow for the consequence of the changes in 
sample firms’ financial leverage degree to show up in prospect of corporate governance.  
The methodology is exclusively planned to organize three econometrics   issues:  a. the existence of unobserved 
firm's explicit effect, that is reduced by considering the 1st difference of the variables, b.  the autoregressive 
behaviour of financial leverage, c. possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In particular, we investigate 
the following model: 
 
ittitititi CLeverageGovernanceCorporateLeverage εα +++⋅⋅+= −−⋅− 1,1,1,1,  
 Eq (1) 
Where αi represent regression coefficient and ε is an error term; and Cit_1 contains control variables 
(Size,cash,tobins'Q,ROE,DIVY). 
5. Empirical Results 
  Table (1) shows for corporate governance proxies used in this study (corporate stockholdings, funds, foreign 
and insider stockholdings). The statistics shown that about 40% of the capitals come from firm's investors,  seven 
percent come from funds and financial institutional investors, nineteen percent  from overseas investors, while 
the large holders grasp on 53 percent  of the capital of ASE firms.  The financial performance for the selected 
firms was excellent; as the average Tobins' Q ratios were 1.6 which is greater than 1 and that means the firm's 
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market value is greater than the company's assets. 27% of the ROE observations were negative with median of 
3%. The selected firms were highly depending on debt and about 31.4% of its financing comes from other 
sources of funds. In addition, the statistics confirm that the means of dividends yields were 2.3 percent, with a 
maximum value of 3.2%. On average the companies hold 5.4% of net assets as cash. In this paper, factors of 
governance were tested include the firm's ownership capital structure, they were related to each other as 
presented in table (2), to deal with this dilemma, we examined the effect of ownership variable on financial 
leverage independently. 
According to the random effects regression outcomes revealed in table (3), funds and institutional holdings show 
a negatively significant effect on leverage, suggesting that financial leverage degree decreased with the increased 
monitoring power of funds and institutional stockholdings. While the holdings of large owners whom hold more 
than 5 percent  has a positively significant relationship with leverage, which can be explained using the 
arguments of the widely accepted pecking order hypothesis (POH)(Myers & Majluf, 1984) which consider the 
function of information asymmetry in influencing  firm’s financing policy. It argues that in the face of 
information asymmetry, corporations will have a preference debt more than equity, and since investors will 
significantly discount the value of equity taking into account agency cost and create an equity offering 
unpleasant for the firms. The other two proxies for corporate governance (corporate and foreign holdings) have 
no effect on the degree of financial leverage. Cash flow shows a negatively significant relationship with degree 
of financial leverage, results are consistent with the theory of free cash flow which suggests that low leverage 
companies are a lesser amount of subject to monitoring, allowing for superior managerial discretions. 
6. Concludes  
The rationale of this paper is to find whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and financial 
leverage on Jordanian firms. Similar to literatures the paper has an important limitation which includes 
developing good proxies for effective governance.  The investigations have shown that the relationship between 
the corporate governance and the degree of leverage is more complicated than anticipated. Overall the findings 
confirm that institutional investors have a negative impact on the financial leverage, while Insiders and huge 
owners have a positive effect on the capital structure decisions and depending on debt. Foreign investors have no 
effect on the degree of leverage. 
The probability to have a relationship between the risk of bankruptcy and corporate governance can be an 
interesting subject for conducting new and future studies. Also, valuating the relationships between the 
probability of corporate bankruptcy and the financial leverage is a good topic for future research. 
We recommended that the managers consider the issues related to the independence board and the presence of 
internal auditor more than before. In addition, shareholders increase the number of non-responsible members of 
board in order to shrink the conflicts between their interests and the members of board's interests. 
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Table (1): Descriptive Statistics. 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
A: ownership structure 
Corporate 
holdings 
 0.402232 0.410951 0.991761 0.002621 0.241585 
Funds 
holdings 
0.073238 0.036093 0.423242 0.000000 0.092516 
Foreign 
holdings 
0.193682 0.087520 0.986546 0.000000 0.235579 
Large owners 
holdings 
0.527404 0.572000 0.972400 0.000000 0.230792 
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B: Corporate performance Variables 
Leverage 0.306989 0.281009 0.837363 0.002049 0.182906 
Div.Yld 0.023232 0.000000 0.322581 0.000000 0.037886 
ROE -0.349503 3.06500 57.21000 -111.1170 20.77695 
Tobins'Q 1.578192 1.254152 8.070894 0.222515 1.109893 
Size 16.49735 16.33305 20.92479 13.22198 1.409052 
Cash 0.053918 0.021558 0.663525 -0.647301 0.111132 
 
 
Table (2):  Pearson correlation coefficient between governance factors presented by ownership structure of firms. 
 
Corporate holdings Funds holdings Foreign holdings Large owners 
holdings 
Corporate holdings 1.000    
Funds holdings -0.140826 
(-2.556432) 
0.0110 
1.0000   
Foreign holdings 0.373924 
7.245867 
0.0000 
-0.027044 
-0.486213 
0.0340 
1.0000  
Large owners 
holdings 
0.408066 
8.033109 
0.0000 
-0.117643 
-2.129081 
0.0340 
0.442325 
8.863811 
0.0000 
1.0000 
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Table (3):  Panel Data Regression (Random effect): Leverage and corporate Governance. 
 
ittitititi CLeverageGovernanceCorporateLeverage εα +++⋅⋅+= −⋅ ,1,,1,
 
 Corporate Governance Proxies 
 
Corporate 
Holdings 
Funds & 
Institutions 
Holdings 
Large Owners 
Holdings  
Foreign Holdings 
Coefficient for Corporate 
Governance Proxies. 
0.020791 -0.058092*** 0.044285** 0.016009 
Cash -0.138564* -0.131549* -0.142184* -0.130990* 
DivYld 0.157482 0.154740 0.205541 0.185062 
Tobins'Q 0.000970 0.000760 -0.002266 0.000445 
Size 0.011983* 0.014229* -0.012550* 0.011519** 
ROE -0.001918* -0.001961* -0.001934* -0.001902* 
Leverage (-1) 0.787062* 0.774056* 0.785384* 0.88377* 
Constant C -0.128500 -0.150416** -0.148306** -0.116117 
 
Adjusted R2 0.757959 0.757355 0.759981 0.757583 
F-Statistic 124.9189 123.1748 126.2965 124.6655 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D.W 2.009996 1.999843 2.001375 2.000389 
* Value is significant at 1%. 
 
** Value is significant at 5%. 
 
*** Value is significant at 10%. 
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